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THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE POWER OF
CONGRESS OVER INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE.
The commerce clause of the Federal Constitution has been
a constant source of disagreement among the justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Decisions have not
always been harmonious. And in nearly every case at least
one, and in many cases several, dissenting opinions have
been filed.
The principal question in dispute has been whether the
grant of commercial power to Congress is exclusive of all
direct power over interstate and foreign commerce upon the
part of the states, or whether the states have concurrent
power thereover with Congress.
Power over interstate commerce is granted by the same
words as power over foreign commerce. No logical distinction can be made between them. Yet, although it is generally admitted that the power of Congress over foreign
commerce is exclusive, three different theories have been
advanced in the opinions of the court as to the power of
Congress over interstate commerce.
First: That Congress has exclusive power over all interstate commerce.
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Second: That Congress and the states have general concurrent power over all interstate commerce.
Third: That Congress has exclusive power over national,
and Congress and the states concurrent power over local
matters of interstate commerce.
Yet because the-second theory was soon generally abandoned, and the first and third lead to the same results in
most cases, they do not seem to have been clearly recognized as distinct theories, nor is the inconsistency of the
reasoning which supports them appreciat~d. Just as the
Federalist and strict constructionalist interpretations of the
Constitution seldom take distinct shape in the opinions, yet
are clearly recognizable in them, so these theories, which,
indeed, resulted from these conflicting interpretations, are
traceable perhaps more frequently as fundamental reasoning than as formulated theories.
This failure to fully recognize them as distinct theories
has caused no little confusion of reasoning, beclouding the
whole subject, and has resulted in considerable inconsistency of decision in those cases where the theories do lead
to different results.
This article is an. endeavor to clarify the subject by a
consideration of the three theories and the reasoning supporting them, and, as a result, to show that only the exclusive theory is sound. Then by tracing the theories chronologically through the opinions of the court, by quotations
therefrom, it is sought to let the reader judge for himself
whether the court has not substantially acted upon that
theory and is free to discard the other two, and that such
action by the court would simplify the subject immensely.
The first theory advanced was that the grant of commercial power to Congress is exclusive of all direct power over
interstate and foreign commerce on the part of the states.
It is a corollary or part of this theory that the states may
exercise their reserved powers in domestic affairs, such as
the regulation of roads, bridges, wharves, ferries, inspection, quarantine, etc., even though they may thereby indirectly affect interstate and foreign commerce, provided Congress has not legislated on the same subject.
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The theory distinguishes sharply between the sources of
power, and between direct and indirect regulation. Power
over foreign and interstate commerce is given to Congress.
The states cannot directly regulate such commerce, because
they would be exercising the very power given to Congress.
Power over domestic affairs is reserved to the states and
cannot be exercised by Congress (except for a national purpose under a power given to Congress). Yet when the
states exercise their reserved powers they indirectly affect
or regulate foreign and interstate commerce. In thus exercising their reserved powers they may at times use measures
of a similar character to measures which Congress may
adopt, but these measures do not flow from the same power.
"All experience shows that the same measures, or measures
scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow from
distinct powers; but this does not prove that the powers
themselves are identical. Although the means used in their
execution may sometimes approach each other so nearly as
to be confounded, there are other situations in which they
are sufficiently distinct as to establish their identity." (Gibbons v. Ogden, infra.) Direct regulation of commerce is
based on the power to regulate it; it is the exercise of that
power. Indirect or incidental regulation is the exercise of
another power from a distinct source which operates in
given cases indirectly upon subjects of interstate or foreign
commerce. It results from the exercise by a state of a reserved power. It can affect subjects of interstate and foreign commerce only, and not the power of Congress over
them, because the power of Congress is supreme. This distinction is important. It follows that when Congress
actually exercises its power over the same subjects the
indirect or incidental regulation by a state resulting from
the exercise of a reserved state power must yield, because
the powers of the states cannot override or control the exercise by Congress of its powers.
We may call this for convenience the Exclusive Theory,
looked at from the standpoint of Congress, or the Reserved
Powers Theory, looked at from the standpoint of the states.
This theory was so forcibly set out, it might almost be said
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demonstrated, by Chief-Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden I (1824), the first case involving the commerce clause,
that it was subsequently assumed by justices of the court,
among them Mr. Justice Story, that this point had been definitely decided and settled.
Other justices, however, pointed out that the actual decision of the case was placed upon other grounds; and thus
freeing themselves from binding precedent, proceeded to
adopt a theory based on states' rights, which had been previously advanced in the License Cases (1847), that the
states have concurrent sovereignty equally with Congress
over all subjects of interstate commerce. They asserted
that the states could exercise full rights of sovereignty over
any and all subjects of interstate commerce until Congress
should exercise its sovereignty over the same subject in
actual conflict therewith, when the state sovereignty must
yield.
Indeed, it was argued that the concurrent sovereignty of
the states over commerce was in all respects equal to that
of Congress, and need not yield to the latter. Thus early
were sown the seeds of the doctrine of nullification. The
argument was not, however, adopted by the court.
The theory adopted we shall call the General Concurrent
Powers Theory.
This theory was soon found untenable. It is in direct
opposition to one of the chief purposes of the commerce
clause, which was to secure commerce from the burdens
and restrictions of local control. Accordingly,. it was soon
abandoned. Nevertheless, it was more consistent with the
commerce clause than the theory to which it gave birth and
which followed it. It disappeared from the opinions entirely
until 1876,2 when three cases were decided upon it. In
subsequent cases (1886-1893)3 these decisions were shown
to have been ill-considered on this point and were overruled.
9 Wheaton x.
2Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; C., B. and Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.

155; and Peik v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 94 U. S. 164.
'IVabash, etc., Ry. v. Illinois, i8 U. S. 557; Covington, etc., Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204.
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Thereupon the theory again disappeared until 1898, when
it reappeared as the basis of a decision 4 which seems clearly
out of harmony with the main trend of decision.
By an attempted compromise of the exclusive-reserved
powers theory and this general concurrent powers theory
there was evolved a hybrid theory which we shall call the
Local Concurrent Powers Theory.
This theory included a part of the exclusive-reserved
powers theory, by admitting that in matters of interstate
commerce permitting or requiring but one uniform or national plan or system of regulation the jurisdiction of Congress is exclusive, and direct regulation by the states is void.
But it maintained that in matters of local concern, admitting of more than one plan of regulation, the states have
direct concurrent powers over interstate commerce with
Congress, which they can exercise until Congress acts on
the same subject, when the state laws yield, so far as inconsistent with the laws of Congress.
It was first advocated by Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens of Philadelphia(i85i).5
It will be seen that this theory and the exclusive-reserved
powers theory agree in .placing some subjects within the
exclusive power of Congress and beyond the power of the
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There is a class of cases, however, where the two theories
have conic in direct conflict. This class consists of subjects,
such as license requirements for sale of interstate goods,
taxation of interstate commerce, and regulation of rates and
charges for interstate transportation.
These and similar cases obviously permit of local regulation, and for the most part do not permit of uniform national regulation. On the local c6ncurrent theory they are
within the concurrent power of the states, and direct regulation of them by the states is constitutional. On the Zxclusive-reserved powers theory they are unconstitutional because they are direct regulations of interstate commerce.
The conflict of the theories is here a direct one. It has
resulted, and is likely to result, in inconsistent decisions.
Yet even here the conflict is more in the reasoning of the
opinions than in the decisions of th#court. This is due to
the facts that the three lines of cases mentioned as examples, license requirements, taxation, and regulation of rates,
compose the greater body of cases of this class, and that
the court has uniformly, except in one early case, and in
the three overruled cases of 1876, and the case in 1898,
as above, held direct state regulation of these to be unconstitutional. This is consistent only with the exclusivereserved powers theory, and is a substantial victory for
that .theory.
Strange to say, however, this does not seem to be recognized. Opinions based on the local concurrent powers
theory conclude with decisions against the constitutionality
of state regulations of these subjects without appreciating
the inconsistency.
This will be more fully gone into below. Suffice it to
say here that, in c6nsequence of early decisions to the effect
stated which have been followed as precedents, the actual
decisions are, in the main, harmonious, although the greatest conflict of reasoning prevails.
The unfortunate thing is that the conflict of reasoning
thus still remains. The court in a decision which is based
fundamentally on one theory often cites a prior decision
which it approves and desires to follow, and quotes the lan-
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guage of the court in that case, although the opinion was
based upon the other theory. The two theories are not
infrequently confused in one opinion. It is not surprising
that the greatest -difference of view has existed among the
justices, and that the cases contain a remarkable number
of dissenting opi*nions. This confuses the whole subject,
leaves the constitutional principles unsettled, and renders
doubtful the outcome of any case not controlled by precedent.
The general recognition of the three theories as distinct
theories would clarify the subject considerably. It would
at least resolve the confusion of reasoning into a clean-cut
conflict of theory, which is a very different matter, and
would thereby open the way to an express decision in favor
of one or the other theory.
Far greater clarification would result, however, should
the court recognize that the general concurrent theory is
untenable, and that in the only class of cases where the
exclusive-reserved powers and the local concurrent powers
theories lead to different results, the court has, with comparatively few exceptions, rendered decisions consistent with
the exclusive theory only, and has thereby practically
adopted that theory.
Should the court so rule, not only would the confusion
of reasoning be eliminated, but, also, the conflict of theory
would be decided.
There would then be. but one basic question in each case:
namely, does the power exercised by a state in a given case
flow from the power to regulate interstate commerce? If
it does, the state law is void. If it does not, but flows from
a reserved power, and only incidentally and indirectly affects commerce, it is valid.
On the other hand, if the court has not overthrown the
local concurrent theory, the conflict and confusion remain.
There are then two basic questions in each case. The first
is the same: Does the power exercised flow from a power
to regulate interstate commerce? The second is the further
question: If it does, is it, nevertheless, such a regulation as
the state has power to make, or is it a matter permitting
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of only one uniform or national plan of regulation, which
the state therefore cannot regulate?
This second question reintroduces the whole contest between the two theories. There are no general principles in
the Constitution or in the decisions of the court by which to
determine what subjects fall within the local and what
within the national class. Consequently each new case
raises the whole question and reintroduces the contest
Proceeding to a general consideration of all three theories, the first inquiry of interest is the historical reason for
the grant to Congress of the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce.
Under the Articles of Confederation the various regulations and taxes of the different states, arising from their
various policies, jealousies, and needs of revenue, seriously
interfered with commerce between them. Also, the several
states found themselves too weak to resist individually the
burdensome regulations imposed upon their foreign commerce by other nations.
This disorganized state of affairs demanded that freedom
from the burden of local regulations and power to cope with
foreign nations be secured by the grant of the power of
commercial regulation to Congress.
On this point Mr. Justice Johnson; in a concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden (supra), says:
" And now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession
of those powers over their own commerce, which they had
so long been deprived of, . . . that selfish principle, which,

etc., . . . began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the states,
and fatal to their commercial interests abroad,"
"This was the immediate cause that led to the forming
of a convention.
"As early as 1778 the subject had been pressed upon
Congress by a memorial from the State of New Jersey;
and in 1781 we find a resolution presented to that body by
one of the most enlightened men of his day, 6 affirming that
' Dr. Witherspoon.
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'it is indispensably necessary that the United States, in
Congress assembled, should be vested with a right of superintending the commercial regulations of every state, that
none may take place that shall be partial or contrary to the
common interests.' The resolution of Virginia,7 appointing her commissioners to meet commissioners from other
states, expresses their purpose to be, ' to take into consideration the trade of the United States, to consider how far an
uniform system in their commercial regulations may be
necessary to their common interests and their permanent
harmony.' And Mr. Madison's resolution is introduced by
a preamble entirely explicit on this point: 'XWhereas, the
relative situation of the United States has been found, on
trial, to require uniformity in their commertial regulations
as the only effectual policy for obtaining, in the ports of
foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges reciprocal to
those enjoyed by the subjects of such nations in the ports
of the United States, for preventing animosities. which
cannot fail to arise among the several states, from the interference of partial and separate regulations,' etc., 'therefore, resolved,' etc."
In the case of Brown v.Maryland s Chief-Justice Marshall
says:
"The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption of the Constitution can scarcely be
forgotten" ....
" It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding
from the feebleness of the Federal Government contributed
more to that great revolution which introduced the present
system than the deep and general conviction that commerce
ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore,
matter of surprise that the grant should be as extensive as
the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce
and all commerce among the states. To construe the power
so as to impair its efficiency would tend to defeat an object
in the attainment of which the American public took, and
'January 21, 1786.
a12 Wheaton, 419
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justly took, that strong interest which arose from a full

conviction of its necessity."
We start then with the historical fact that the commerce
clause of the Constitution was framed and intended to take
the burdensome power of local regulation from the states.
Consequently both the general concurrent and the local concurrent powers theories are opposed to the purpose of the
commerce clause. They leave to the states, in whole or in

part, the very power the clause was designed to take from
them. The very thing asserted to support them-that is,
the possibility of local control-is historically the strongest
argument against them both.
Following naturally from the purpose for which the
clause was enacted is the second historic fact that those
who framed the Constitution, and their contemporaries, at
once and universally accepted the commerce clause to mean
that all power of regulation of interstate and foreign commerce had been taken from the states and vested exclusively
in Congress. On this point Mr. Justice Johnson, in
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, says:
"The history of the times will, therefore, sustain the
opinion that the grant of power over commerce, if intended
to be commensurate with the evils existing and the purpose
of remedying those evils, could be only commensurate with
the power of the states over the subject. And this opinion
is supported by a very remarkable evidence of the general
understanding of the whole American people when the grant
was made. There was not a state in the Union in which
there did not, at that time, exist a variety of commercial
regulations, concerning which it is too much to suppose
that the whole ground covered by those iegulations was immediately assumed by actual legislation, under the authority
of the Union. But where was the existing statute on this
subject that a state attempted to execute? orby what state
was it ever thought necessary to repeal those statutes? "By
common consent, those laws dropped lifeless from their
statute-books for want of the sustaining power that had
been relinquished to Congress."
The freedom from local regulation which it was desired
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to secure would easily have been gained had the Constitution been framed and intended to abolish the state governments. But as this was neither the intention nor effect of the
Constitution, which formed a nation by the union of states
that preserved their identities and much of their individual
sovereignty. surrendering a part only thereof to the General Government, it is advisable to consider the general
working plan on which the sovereignty was divided between the state and Federal Governments, and by which
provision was made for the action and interaction. of the
two sovereignties, and then to consider how this plan applied to the division of sovereignty over commerce.
Two, and only two, sovereignties are created or recognized by the Constitution, that of the Federal Government
and that of the state governments. What powers are not
granted to the first are reserved to the second. The Federal
Government is sovereign in the exercise of its granted powers, and the states are sovereign in the exercise of their
reserved powers. Neither one can directly encroach or overlap upon the sovereignty of the other. But the two sovereignties extend over the same people and are closely interwrought. As a necessary result, neither one can exercise
its own powers without indirectly affecting and overlapping
upon the persons and subjects over which the sovereignty
of the other extends. This must, therefore, necessarily be
permitted where there is no direct conflict in the actual exercise of powers. If it were not, neither could exist.
Where, however, both undertake to actually exercise powers, each its own, which result in conflict, one or the other
must yield. It is accordingly provided in the Constitution
that in such cases the states must yield, the Constitution and
treaties and laws made thereunder being declared the
supreme law of the land.
Sovereignty over commerce is divided between the two
governments. To Congress is given sovereignty over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states
and with the Indian tribes. To the states is reserved sovereignty, to each respectively, over commerce entirely within
its own bounds.
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Congress cannot directly exercise sovereignty over the
internal commerce of a state, and a state cannot directly
exercise sovereignty over interstate and foreign commerce.
But commerce is a broad word, including passengers and
freight, buying and selling, and intercourse in general. And
when Congress actually exercises its power over interstate
commerce, or almost any of its other powers, such as taxing,
.coinage, fixing standards of weights and measures, establishing post offices and roads, etc., it indirectly affects and
incidentally regulates the internal commerce of the states.
Nevertheless, such exercise of power by Congress is valid.
Otherwise, Congress could not exercise its powers at all.
When a state actually exercises its power over its internal commerce or almost any other of its reserved powers,
such as taxation, prescribing liability for negligence and
other torts, the laws of contracts, the control of bridges and
roads and of pilots, the protection of the health and safety
of its people, etc., it indirectly affects and incidentally
regulates interstate commerce. Nevertheless, such exercise
of power by a state is valid. Otherwise, the states could not
exercise their powers at all.
Where, however, both Congress and a state undertake to
actually exercise powers, each its own, which result indirectly in conflicting regulations of interstate commerce,
one or the other must yield, and the Constitution has prescribed that in such case the state must yield to the extent
to which its actual exercise of power conflicts with the
actual exercise of power by Congress.
With the purpose, then, of freeing commerce from local
control, and under this plan of divided sovereignty, the
framers of the Constitution formulated the commerce clause,
and the states ratified and adopted it.
This clause, so formulated and adopted, has produced so
much contention and confusion of reasoning that before we
plunge into a consideration of it, it will be well for us to
pause and take our bearings, after the example of Daniel
Webster when, in opening his reply to Hayne, he said:
"When the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick
weather, and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails him-
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self of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the
sun, to take his latitude, and ascertain how far the elements
have driven him from his true course. Let us imitate this
prudence, and, before we float farther upon the waves of
this debate, refer to the point from w!vich we departed, that
we may at least be able to conjecture where we now are.
I ask for the reading of the resolution before the Senate."
The provision of the Constitution under discussion is:
"The Congress shall have power:
"To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The words of the grant are general, containing no distinction or division 6f the subject matter. It grants commercial
power to Congress in general terms. Consequently it grants
away all or none of the concurrent power of the states. If it
grants all, then Congress has exclusive power; if it grants
none, then the states retain general concurrent power.
Both the exclusive theory and the general concurrent
theory are therefore consistent with the terms of the grant
in this respect.
But it is not a divided grant. It does not grant away the
concurrent power of the states over some subjects and leave
it over other subjects.
The local concurrent theory is therefore absolutely at
variance with the terms of the grant.
This seems to have been entirely overlooked in the eagerness of some justices to seize and of others to acquiesce in
the last theory as a sort of a compromise and working basis.
Moreover, the court has distinctly stated that the power
of Congress over foreign commerce is exclusive of any and
all power thereover on the part of the states.9 But the
grant of power over foreign commerce is conferrcd by the
same words, the very identical words, which confer the
power over interstate commerce. The one phra-:. "The
Congress shall have power: To regulate commerce, is applied to both "commerce among the states" and "with
I Chy Lung v. Freenan, 92 U. S. 275; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S.
465; Brown v. Iouston, 114 U. S. 622; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141
U. S. 47.
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foreign nations." If it confers exclusive power as to one,
it does to the other. It cannot mean two different things at
the same time.
It would seem unnecessary to go any further, but the
philosophy of Berkeley and Hume denied the existence of
material objects, such as tables, chairs, etc., and there is
much legal interpretation of a sort which disperses the
strongest language as the sun disperses snow.Therefore, if we admit that it is possible for the same
words to mean two different inconsistent things at the same
time, and that the general grant may not be general but may
be two particular grants each less than general, to what are
we led?
There is not a word in the Constitution to show where
the division line is to be drawn, not a word to show over
what subjects or classes of subjects the states retain sovereignty, and over what subjects they granted away their
sovereignty to Congress. The court says that at least as to
all matters permitting or requiring but one uniform or
national plan of regulation the power of Congress is exclusive, and has suggested that as to local matters the states
have concurrent power. But the Constitution does not distinguish these subjects from each other.
If the court has created this distinction, and has committed itself to it as a basis of decision, it has assumed
arbitrary power of legislation rising to the height of amendment of the Constitution. It has amended the Constitution
by reading into it a division of the subjects of commerce
which the Constitution does not make.
This division is as arbitrary as it would be for the court
to hold that the subjects of commerce and the power of
regulation of them are divided on the basis that the states
can regulate all commerce while within their respective
limits, whether in the course of interstate transportation or
not, provided that their regulations do not extend to commerce, or affect the conduct of carriers and other agents
of commerce, beyond the territorial limits of the respective
states; but that Congress has exclusive power to impose
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regulations extending over commerce, or controlling its

agents, in more than one state.
For instance, on this division of the grant local license
requirements regulating the sale of interstate goods would
be constitutional. The early prohibition statutes would
have been held constitutional, and the Wilson Act, which
afterwards permitted the states to pass such laws, would
have been unnecessary. So, also, the State Freight Tax
Case, 10 in which Pennsylvania attempted to impose a transportation tax per ton on all freight while in transit within
the state, would have been held constitutional. A statute,
however, such as the statute of Indiana, in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton," which required telegraph
companies to deliver messages where the addressee lives
within a mile of the telegraph station or in the town, and
applied not only to messages received in Indiana for delivery in Indiana, but also to messages received in Indiana
for delivery in other states, would be held unconstitutional
in so far as it attempted to control the conduct of telegraph
companies beyond the state of Indiana.
Again, the court might with equal ease hold that the
states can regulate .while in their respective territories all
commerce beginning or ending within their limits, on the
ground that Such commerce is an integral part of the commerce of the respective states; but that they cannot regulate
commerce passing entirely through their territorial limits, because the regulation of that belongs to Congress alone. It
is too obvious to need illustration that on this division of
the grant many of the decisions of the court could not
stand.
Here, then, are three possible divisions of the grant among
the many which can be conceived. The Constitution does
not create one of them. It confers the commercial power
upon Congress in a few brief words of general grant. If
the court has or should divide the grant and pro.:-ulgate
one of these three, or of the many other possible divisions
15 Wal.
122 U.

232.

S. 347.
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of the grant, it has or would amend the Constitution of its
own choice, unrestrictedl by anything save its own pleasure
and wisdom.
We should be loath to admit that the court has cornmitted itself to a position which is in effect an amendment
to the Constitution.
But if we ignore both the historic reasons for the grant
and the historic fact of the immediate and universally accepted meaning of the grant, and if we concede that the
identical words mean one thing as to foreign and another
as to interstate commerce, that the general grant may be
divided, and that the court has arbitrarily created and committed itself to one of several possible divisions of the subject not found in the Constitution, we are still left in a very
uncomfortable position.
If it be true that the court has practically amended the
Constitution by dividing the grant, and has given Congress
and the states concurrent power over matters permitting of
local control, and Congress exclusive control over matters
requiring uniform control, it is certain that there are no
guiding principles in the commerce clause, or any other part
of the Constitution, or in any decisions of the court so far
rendered by which to determine what subjects fall within
one class and what within the other.
Consequently the court must either further amend the
Constitution by formulating such principles, or else, so far
as the Constitution is concerned, remain free to decide in
any case, apart from the few precedents it has established,
according to the ideas of expediency and of the interests of
the country which may prevail in the court from time to
time. In the latter case, individuals, corporations, and state
legislatures would be left without guiding principles of law
by which their acts would be judged, and must await and
submit to the arbitrary decision of the court.
That is not in harmony with the English system of jurisprudence.
These considerations of general principles lead to the
conclusion that only the exclusive theory is sound. Briefly
reviewed, they are: that historically the purpose of the
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commerce clause was to free commerce from control by the
states; that the historic fact is that it was immediately so
accepted, and all state regulations fell; that it is admitted
that Congress has exclusive power over foreign commerce,
and that since the same words grant power over interstate
commerce Congress must have exclusive power over it also;
that the grant is a general one and not a divided one; that
it would be arbitrary amendment of the Constitution for the
court to divide it; that it would be as much so to divide it
according to the local concurrent powers theory as according to any other possible division; that if the court should
divide the grant and establish two classes of subjects of
commerce, it would be necessary that the subjects be classified according to established general principles, and that as
such principles are not contained in the Constitution it would
be still further amendment of the Constitution for it to
formulate them. and that without so doing the court would
be without Constitutional restraint in this respect.
Proceeding from general principles to the question what
theory the court has in fact adopted, it cannot be contended
that it has adopted the general concurrent theory. On the
other hand, that it has practically adopted the exclusivereserved powers theory, and not only has not committed
itself to the local concurrent theory, but has by implication
negatived it, appears from several facts.
In the first place, although Mr. Justice Curtis did set 6p
the local concurrent powers theory, and sone justices have
since followed him, and there is much of the- reasoning of
that theory in the opinions, yet other justices frequently
question it, and there is much reasoning against it. Thus
in 1875 the court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller, 12
said,"But this doctrine has always been controverted by this
court, and has seldom, if ever, been stated without dissent."
While in 1889 Mr. Chief-Justice Fuller,13 in an opinion
quoted on page 548, showed very clearly that the so-called
"Jlendcrson v. Mayor of Ncw York,
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100.

92 U. S. 259.
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exercise by the states of direct concurrent power over interstate commerce in local affairs is nothing more than the exercise of their reserved powers indirectly affecting commerce.
And even in cases which do not actively controvert the
theory, it is frequently questioned and practically thrust
aside, being stated tentatively in effect thus: "If there be
a class of cases as to' which the states have concurrent
powers, at least as to the class of subjects of which this case
is one, Congress has exclusive jurisdiction."
On the other hand, an express decision that the power of
Congress is not exclusive will be looked for in vain.
Secondly, the court has never, in fact, formulated any
general principles by which to determine what subjects are
in a local and what in a national class. Without this the
theory is incomplete.
Mr. David Walter Brown, writing in the Columbia Law
Review for November, 1904, recognizes this lack of general
principles and offers some well-considered suggestions to
supply them.
But we submit that the remedy does not lie in suggestions
to the court to proceed further in making its own grant and
division of the commercial power, but in recognizing that
the Constitution has made the grant, .and has not left it to
the court to grant it or divide it in its wisdom. The remedy
lies in pointing out the fact that though the court has at
times shown, a disposition to substitute a division of its
own creation of the commercial power into two classes
which would leave it free to subject commerce to concurrent
state power or exclusively to Federal power at will according to its own ideas, it has in the main recognized the fact
that the Constitution by one general grant has. given the
entire and exclusive power of direct regulation of interstate commerce to Congress.
Thirdly, the decisions of the court, with comparatively
few exceptions, are in harmony with the exclusive-reserved
powers theory, whereas a very, great number, including
many of the most important ones, are inconsistent with the
local concurrent powers theory.
It is this great fact which, more than the written opin-
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ions of the court and in spite of some of them, shows that
the court has in fact, in its actual decisions, practically acted
upon the exclusive-reserved powers theory and negatived the
local concurrent powers theory.
The cases fall naturally into two classes-states statutes
held constitutional, and state statutes held unconstitutional.
The state statutes held constitutional may be sustained
on the exclusive-reserved powers theory, and it is unnecessary to base their validity upon a power in the states to
regulate commerce. With few exceptions they have been
statutes upon such subjects as roads, ferries, bridges,
wharves, pilotage, inspection, quarantine, etc., all subjects
over which, as is pointed out by Chief-Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden, "no direct power is given to Congress,
and which therefore remain subject to state legislation."
Undoubtedly legislation on these subjects indirectly regulates commerce, but since such legislation is within the reserved powers of the states, it is unnecessary, and seems contrary to the fact, to call it direct regulation of commerce, and
assert that its authority is derived from a power to regulate
commerce.
Chief-Justice Marshall, as previously quoted in part, says
in the same case:
" So if a state, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged
to be within its control, and with a view to those subjects,
shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which
Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from
the particular power which has been granted, but from some
other which remains with the states and may be executed
by the same means. All experience shows that the same
measures, or measures scarcely distinguishable from each
other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does not
prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although
the means used in their execution may sometimes approach
each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other
situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to establish
their individuality."
And Mr. Chief-Justice Fuller, in Leisy v. Hardin,14 shows
2'
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that the so-called permissible direct regulations by states of
commerce in local affairs are really only the exercise by the
states of their reserved powers indirectly regulating commerce. He says:
"After all, it amounts to no more than drawing the line
between the exercise of power over -commerce with foreign
nations and among the states and the exercise of power over
purely local commerce and local concerns."
"The conclusion follows that, as the grant of the power
to regulate commerce among the states, so far as one system
is required, is exclusive, the states cannot exercise that
power without the assent of Congress, and, in the absence
of legislation, it is left for the courts to determine when
state action does or does not amount to such exercise, or,
in other words, what is or is not a regulation of such commerce. When that is determined, controversy is at an end.
"These decisions rest upon the undoubted right of the
states of the Union to control their purely internal affairs,
in doing which they exercise powers not surrendered to the
National Government"
This makes it evident that the cases where state statutes
have been sustained are consistent wth the exclusive-reserved
powers theory, and are in reality based on it, even though
the opinions in some cases are based on a supposed local
concurrent powers theory. It also goes to the very base
of the latter theory, and removes its foundation at one stroke
by showing that the supposed local direct 'regulations by
states are merely indirect regulations resulting from the
legitimate exercise by the states of their-reserved powers.
The state statutes held unconstitutional present a direct
issue between state power and Federal power. Unlike the
past cases, the two theories do not in these cases lead to the
same result, but to different results. The conflict is a direct
one. They are cases of regulation of interstate commerce,
which though local are necessarily direct, and can flow only
from a power to regulate commerce.
The actual decisions in these cases with few exceptions
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are consistent only with the exclusive-reserved powers
theory.
This fact leads to the most important conclusion that,
generally speaking, the"court has decided in accordance with
the exclusive-reserved powers theory and contrary to the
local concurrent powers theory whenever the two theories
have come into direct conflict. The exceptions, though important, have not been sufficiently numerous to weigh seriously against the conclusion.
To appreciate the full significance of the decisions in these
cases it is necessary to first consider the grounds on which
must be based the division between the subjects of commerce
which is asserted as the basis of the local concurrent powers
theory. This is the division into those subjects which permit of local and those which require one uniform or national
system of regulation.
From a theoretical standpoint we have seen that no such
division is made in the Constitution, and that for the court
to make it would be to amend the Constitution by judicial
legislation. Further, that if the division be made, there are
no general principles to be found in the Constitution by
which to fix its nature and decide what subjects fall within
one class and what within the other. In the present consideration of what the court has actually done, if we grant,
as we must, that it has at times announced such a division,
we may still say that it has never announced any such general principles.
Therefore, in order to determine whether we are correct or not in saying that the court in the only cases presenting a direct conflict between the two theories, which are
the cases now under consideration, has not as a matter of
fact followed this division, it becomes of the greatest importance to determine what must be the nature of the division. This is the crucial consideration in reaching a conclusion on this point.
The. division of the subjects of commerce into those permitting of local and those requiring one uniform or national
system of regulation must be based on something in the
nature of the subjects themselves. it cannot be a division,
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depending solely on the pleasure of the court, between subjects which in its wisdom it thinks ought to be subject to
local control, and those which it thinks ought to be subject
only to national control. That would so obviously place
the court above the Constitution, and give it the power to
dispose of sovereignty over commerce at its will, subjecting commerce to concurrent state control or exclusively
to national control according to its ideas of expediency
and wisdom, that it is not to be thought of for a moment.
It would mean that no case would be determined according to previously established principles of law, but must
await the pleasure of the court. It would mean that from
the smallest business man to the largest company, from
the most insignificant common carrier to the most farreaching, no interstate business could be conducted, with
any knowledge whether the business might be hampered or
destroyed by a state or states in favor of local business or
policy, or whether Congress alone" would be given power
to regulate it, until an actual case involving that very business, or perhaps many cases involving many phases of it,
had arisen and been carried to this court for final legislative
adjudication.
To merely state such a proposition is to disprove it. The
court is a court, adjudicating cases according to pre-established principles of law, not'a legislature meeting each
situation as it arises, according to expediency at.the time.
Though "judicial legislation" must unavoidably occur incidentally, to some extent, it can never be claimed by the
court as an open and arbitrary right, nor extend to the foundation of one of the most important provisions of the Constitution.
If the division is made at all, it must be between those
subjects which by their nature permit of local regulation
and those which by their nature require one uniform or national system of control.
The local concurrent powers theory can in this connection be stated thus: All subjects which by their nature
permit of local control are subject to concurrent state con-
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trol; all which by their nature permit of only national control are subjedt exclusively to control by Congress.
But the court in the cases we are considering has decided

that certain subjects, which by their nature obviously permit
of local control, are not subject to concurrent state control,
but exclusively to control by Congress. Thereby the court
has negatived that theory, and has shown that it does not
in its actual decisions make or follow that alleged division
of the subjects of interstate commerce.
These cases are many and important. The most numerous of them are the three lines of cases previously specially
mentioned, regulation of transportation rates and charges,
taxation, and license requirements for sale of interstate
goods. Owing to the development of steam transportation
both by land and water and the increase of foreign and
domestic commerce these lines of cases comprise a large proportion of the decisions of the court under the commerce
clause, include many of its most important ones.
Railroad rates vary in different parts of the country.
They are not the same in mountainous and in flat regions;
nor in thinly and densely populated regions; nor where
affected by competition or special trade or market conditions -and where not so affected. Through rates are made
up by a combination of local rates. Domestic steamship and
steamboat rates vary according to the nature of the waters
traversed, the amount of traffic, competition, accommodations afforded, etc. Yet in the face of the fact that transportation rates and charges all permit of local regulation the
court holds that the states cannot regulate them. And in
the face of the fact that they do not permit of one uniform
regulation the court has held that Congress can regulate
them and has the exclusive power to do so.
License regulations and taxes are essentially local. Various
prohibition and liquor license regulations exist to-day in
the different states. There are countless other license regulations which it would be possible to impose on all kinds of
business in the states and in the cities or localities thereof.
Taxes may be of so local a nature that they can be imposed
on commerce in every state, county, city, or borough thereof.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

Yet in the face of this the court holds that the states cannot
impose license regulations for the sale of interstate goods or
tax interstate commerce.
These three most important lines of decisions, as likewise
all the class of cases of which they form a part, are thus
directly opposed to" the local concurrent sovereignty theory.
The fact, previously mentioned, that in the opinions in such
cases that theory is at times reasserted by confusion of reasoning does not alter the fact that the actual decisions are
inconsistent with it.
This inconsistency will be clearly seen in the sharp light
of contrast by a comparison of the case of Crandall v.
Nevada,15 which was the first case involving a question of
this kind after Cooley v. Wardens, supra, and which logically applied and followed the local concurrent powers theory
as announced in that case, with a long line of subsequent
cases decided contrary to its logic.In Crandallv. Nevada the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute of the state imposing a tax upon
railroad and stage companies of one dollar for every passenger carried out of the state.
The court in following Cooley v. Wardens applied the
local concurrent theory logically to the following effect.
The power of Congress to make national regulations of
commerce is exclusive, but the states may make local regulations not amounting to national regulations. The statute
in this case does "not institute any regulation of commerce
of a national character." It is therefore not in violation of
the commerce clause.
This was the unspeakable logic of the syllogism. It was
the necessary application of the theory of Cooley v. Wardens
if that theory was to be followed.
Had the court seen any escape from this logic, or possibility of reaching another decision under this theory, it
would have-taken advantage of it; for to avoid the evils
of such a decision it went to the extreme length of holding
the statute unconstitutional as being inconsistent with the
"S6 Wal. 35 (1867).

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

objects for which the Federal Government was established
in that it interfered with the right of the Government to
summon its citizens, and the right of the citizens to go to
the seat of Government in Washington, to the halls of Congress, etc., and also the right of the Government to transport
troops.
Subsequently, however, evidently realizing that a way
around the logic of this case could not always be found, and
foreseeing the disastrous results to which it would lead, and
to what extent it would re-establish the burdens of local
control, the court soon retraced its steps and reversed the
logic of Crandallv. Nevada in respect to the application of
the theory of Cooley v. Wardens.
To have followed that case and to have subjected commerce, then well on its way to its present tremendous development, to a logical application of that theory would
have resubjected interstate carriers, both by land and by
water, to that control by the states from which the commerce
clause was designed to free them. It would have placed the
sale of interstate goods at the mercy of the states. It would
have restored to the. states power to tax interstate business
out of existence within their limits in favor of local business.
In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any interstate commerce the rates and charges for that part of which is done
within a state could not be locally regulated by the state,
which could not be taxed locally by the state, and for the
transaction of which local license requirements could not
be imposed. It is therefore not too much to say that the
local concurrent powers theory of Cooley v. Wardens, as
logically followed and applied in Crandallv. Nevada, would,
if persisted in, practically have resubjected all interstate
commerce to control by the states.
It is not to be wondered at that the court shrank from
such consequences and has not followed that case.
Unfortunately, -t did not at the same time overrule and
eliminate the theory on which the conclusion in this respect
was based. When this application of the theory in Crandall
v. Nevada was departed from, the theory of Cooley v.
Wardens was not e.pressly discarded. On the contrary, it
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was apparently allowed to remain, and has continued
through many of the opinions though decision after decision
contrary to its logical application has been handed down.
The result has been that confusion of reasoning has taken
the place of the clear-cut syllogistic logic of Crandall v.
Nevada, and the theory of Cooley v. Wardens has been reasserted as the basis of decisions which are the direct opposite
of the logical application of that theory. It is for that reason we say that although the local concurrent powers theory
is thus reasserted in the opinions, the great majority of the
actual decisions of the court are against it, and that in those
particular lines of cases where the theories lead to different
results the decisions are overwhelmingly against it.
Reviewing, then, what the court has actually done, we
find:
That it has twice overruled the general concurrent powers
theory and has so far discarded it that it would be safe to
ignore it, were it not for one recent important decision.
That the local concurrent powers theory has always been
hotly disputed, and is stated tentatively and in effect waived
aside even in many cases which do not expressly controvert
it. That in those cases where this and the exclusive theory
lead to the same results the decisions are equally supportable
upon the latter theory as upon this. That in those cases
where these two theories lead to opposite results, which are
numerous and most important, the actual decisions of the
court have been uniformly inconsistent with the former and
consistent with the latter theory.
That the exclusive theory, notwithstanding reasoning inconsistent therewith in many of the opinions, is consistent
with all of the decisions of the court except comparatively
few, and is the only theory with which the decisions of the
court in fact harmonize.
The conclusion seems justified that on general principles
the court should, and that, in fact, in its decisions it has,
generally speaking, followed the exclusive theory.
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PART II.

The development, discussion, and ultimate disposition of
the different theories as above can be traced only by a close
chronological reading of the opinions with a view not only
to their express language, but particularly to the fundamental reasoning on which they are based.
This requires quotation of the opinions at considerable
length. In fact, to develop the subject adequately requires
more space than can here be occupied, though sufficient
space can be given for the most important opinions.
The doctrine of the silence of Congress will not be gone
into. It depends on what theory of exclusiveness is held.
If the power of Congress is exclusive, all direct regulations
by the states are void, whether Congress is silent or not,
thought indirect regulations stand or fall as Congress is
silent on the subject or not. If the states have general concurrent power, then all state regulations, both direct and indirect, are valid in the silence of Congress. If the states have
local concurrent power, the silence of Congress in matters requiring national control can confer no rights of direct regulation on the states, but in local matters it can. There is a
corollary doctrine that wvhen Congress speaks on part of a
subject it is equivalent to a declaration that the remainder
shall be free, but this, too, depends upon the -theories of
exclusiveness.
These doctrines, in their varying and conflicting forms,
are another reason for thi express abolition of two of the
theories of exclusiveness.
The cases here follow, with running comments on them:
REVIEW OF THE CASES.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton I (1824).

This is the first case in which the question of the respective
powers of Congress and the states is reviewed. It involved
the power of the state of New York to grant an exclusive
license to navigate the waters of that state in vessels propelled by steam. In a strong decision by Chief-Justice
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Marshall several points were so clearly demonstrated as to
remain unquestioned ever since. In the first place, it decided
that commerce means more than buying and selling or
the interchange of commodities, that it comprehends navigation, and that '"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more; 'it is intercourse." Secondly, it decides
that in the grant of power over "commerce among the several states" "the word 'among' means intermingled with
. . . Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced
into the interior." And also" In regulating commerce with
foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at thl
jurisdictional lines of the several states. It would be a very
useless power if it could not pass those lines. . .

If Con-

gress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised wherever the subject exists."
On the broad and fundamental question of the division
of power over commerce between the Federal and state
Governments the court proceeds to demonstrate, and praetically decides, that the power over interstate and foreign
commerce granted to Congress is exclusive of any and all
power over that subject by or on the part of the states. But
on account of an expression to the effect that a decision of
that point was not necessary in the case because, at all
events, Congress had legislated on the subject, and its enactment must be supreme, a dispute subsequently arose and was
for some time waged in the opinions and dissenting opinions of this court and its justices, whether the court did or.
did not by this case decide that the grant to Congress of
this power is exclusive.
The language of the opinion on this point is as follows:
" But when a state proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several states, it is exercising
the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the
very thing which Congress is authorized to do."
That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce will not be denied; but that a
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power to regulate commerce is the source from which the

right to pass them is derived cannot be admitted."
"They form a portion of that immense mass of legisla-

tion which embraces everything within the territory of a
state not surrendered to the General Government: all which
can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of
every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal
commerce of a state, and those which respect turnpike roads,
ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass.
" No direct general power over these objects is granted to
Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to state
legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach
them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where
the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is
clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given."
"So, if a state, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged
to be within its control, and, with a view to those subjects,
shall adopt a measure of the same character with one which
Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from
the particular power which has been granted, but from
some other, which remains with the state, and may be
executed by the same means. All experience shows that the
same measures, or measures scarcely distinguishable from
each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does
not prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although the means used in their execution may sometimes
approach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are
other situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to
establish their individuality.
" In our complex system . . . contests respecting power

must arise. .Were it ever otherwise, the measures taken
by the respective governments to execute their acknowledged
powers would often be of the same description, and might,
sometimes, interfere. This, however, does not prove that
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the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers
of the other."
From this it will be seen that the principles which we
set out to show are the true and enduring principles decided
by the cases were advanced and are argued almost to the
point of demonstration, and were practically decided by
the court, in this celebrated opinion by Chief-Justice
Marshall. A sharp line was there drawn between the
exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce and
the exclusive power of the states each over its internal
commerce.
It was shown that neither one can exercise the power of
the other. Also because of the complexity of our system
the states must be permitted in exercising their own powers
to indirectly affect the subjects of interstate and foreign
commerce. But they cannot affect the power of Congress
over that commerce, because the power of Congress is supreme and must prevail.
The distinction between indirectly affecting subjects of
interstate commerce and exercising or indirectly affecting
the power over it is important. The idea. may be expressed
thus: Congress has exclusive power over interstate commerce, therefore a state cannot exercise that power. The
acts of Congress within its powers are supreme, therefore
a state cannot indirectly affect or regulate the exercise of
that power by Congress. But our system is so complex that
a state cannot possibly exercise its reserved powers without
indirectly affecting subjects of interstate or foreign commerce, therefore it must be permitted to do so when it does
not affect the exercise of power by Congress.
We thus have completely developed and expounded in
this case the exclusivc-rcscrcd powers theory.
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419 (1827).
This case involved the validity of an act of Maryland requiring all importers of foreign articles or commodities to
take out a license and pay a fee therefor before they would
be allowed to sell the same. The opinion in this case. is
also by Chief-Justice Marshall. After again referring to
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the conflicting regulations of commerce among the confederated states he says:
" It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding
from the feebleness of the Federal Government contributed
more to that great revolution which introduced the present
system, than the deep and general conviction that commerce
ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore, a
matter of surprise that the grant should be extensive as the
mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce, and
all commerce among the states. To construe the power so
as to impair its efficacy would tend to defeat an object in
the attainment of which the American public took, and justly
took, that strong interest which rose from a full conviction
of its necessity."
"What would be the language of a foreign government
which should be informed that its merchants, after importing according to law, were forbidden to sell the merchandise
imported ?"
"Such a state of things would break up commerce. It
will not meet this argument to say that this state of things
will never be produced; that the good sense of the states
is a sufficient security against it. The Constitution has not
confided this subject to that good sense. It is placed elsewhere. The question is, where does the power reside, not
how or will it be probably abused? The power claimed by
the state is in its nature in conflict with that given to Congress; and the greater or less extent in which it may be
exercised does not enter into the inquiry concerning its
existence."
"The Act of . . . Maryland . . . is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States and, consequently, void."
Here is an express statement that the power in questiodi
has not been confided to the States, but given to Congress,
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and that the extent to which it may be exercised does not
enter into the question of its existence. This case supports
the cxclusivc-rcscrvcd powers theory.
It might have been supposed that these two cases had
settled that the power in Congress is exclusive, but there
followed a case n ar the border line of local direct regulation, in which the opinion is not conclusive, and another
in which the question is treated as an open one.
Willson et al. v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2
Peters, 245 (1829).
This case involved the constitutionality of an act of Delaware authorizing the construction of a drainage dam across.
a small, sluggish tidal stream running through a pestilential
marsh.
The court in an opinion by Chief-Justice Marshall held
that measures such as these "are undoubtedly within those
which are reserved to the states ;" that the abridgment of the
use of the stream is an affair between the state and its citizens
unless in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the
United States; that Congress has not legislated on the subject; and that the act authorizing the dam cannot, "under
all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state."
The damming of a navigable stream is very close to
direct regulation of interstate commerce, and yet "under
all the circumstances of the case" any interference that may
have been caused to commerce by this dam seems to have
been so incidental and trifling that the court appears to treat
it as a negligible quantity. The decision appears to rest on
the special circumstances of the case, but as the measure is
pronounced a reserved measure, and the question of conflict with the dormant power of Congress is considered,
which question could arise in the case of such a purely local
regulation only on the exclusive theory, the case must be
classified as based on the exclusive-resered powers theory.
City of New York v. Miln, ii Peters, 102 (1837).
The question involved was the constitutionality of a statute of New York requiring reports from masters of in-'
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coming vessels as to name, place of birth, last legal settlement, etc., of passengers.
The majority of the court, notwithstanding the two previous cases, seemed to consider that the question whether
the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress is
or is not exclusive was an open question, which it was not
necessary for them to decide, because they say: "We are of
opinion that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of
police, and that being thus considered it was passed in the
exercise of a power which rightfully belongs to the states."
S. . " It is apparent from the whole scope of the law that,
etc." . . . "and for the purpose a report was required of
the names, places of birth, of all passengers, that the necessary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent
them from becoming charges as paupers.
"Now, we hold that both the end and the means here
used are within the competency of the states, since a portion
of their powers were surrendered to the Federal Government. Let us see what powers are left with the states."
"We think it as competent and as necessary for a state
to provide precautionary measures against the-moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as it
is to guard against the physical pestilence which may arise
from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a
ship the crew of which may be laboring under an infectious
disease."
"We are therefore of opinion that . . . the act .
does not assume to regulate commerce . . . and is constitutional."
It will be seen that the reasoning in this case is consistent
with the foregoing cases in that it holds with them that the
exercise by a state of one of its acknowledged powers is not
invalid because of an indirect regulation of interstate commerce. Justice Story in a strong dissenting opinion differs
with his colleagues not in theory, but in application of the
theory to the facts of the case. He goes the full length of
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the argument and practical decision of Chief-Justice Marshall in the previous cases, and shows that the Chief-Justice
intended to rule that the power of Congress is exclusive.
Tested by this, he considered the statute unconstitutional
because it applied not only to passengers who arrive at
New York, but also to all who have been landed at places
out of the territorial limits of New York. His language
is as follows:
" It has been argued that the power of Congress to regulate commerce is not exclusive, but concurrent with that of
the states. If this were a new question in this court, wholly
untouched by doctrine or decision, I should not hesitate to
go into a full examination of all the grounds upon which
concurrent authority is attempted to be maintained. But
in point of fact, the whole argument on this very question,
as presented by the learned counsel on the present occasion,
was presented by the learned counsel who argued the case
of Gibbons v. Ogden,1 6 and it was then deliberately examined and deemed inadmissible by the court. Mr. ChiefJustice Marshall, with his accustomed accuracy and fulness of illustration, reviewed at that time the whole grounds
of the controversy, and from that time to the present the
question has been considered (as far as I know) to be at
rest. The power given to Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the states has been deemed
exclusive, from the nature and objects of the power, and
the necessary implications growing out of its exercise..
"In this opinion I have the consolation to know that I
had the entire concurrence, upon the same grounds, of that
great constitutional jurist, the late Mr. Chief-Justice Marshall. Having heard the former arguments, his deliberate
opinion was that the act of New York was unconstitutional
and that the present case fell directly within the principles
established in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden 1 7 and Brown v.
The State of Maryland." 18
is 9 Wheaton R. x.

R. x.
12 Wheat. R. 419.

gT
9 Wheat
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Mention in the above of the argument that the states have
concurrent power with Congress to regulate commerce is
worthy.of special note.
This theory was passed by without decision by the majority of the court, but is thus refuted by Mr. Justice Story.
In subsequent decisions it will be seen that this theory was
again advanced and introduced much confusion into the reasoning of the court and of individual justices. This case
may also be classified as supporting the exclwsive-reserved
powers theory.
Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 5o5 (i8..i).
The conflict between the exclusive theory and the concurrent sovereignty theory takes decided form in this case.
The question involved the validity of the Constitution of
Mississippi, providing that "the importation of slaves shall
be prohibited from and after May I, 1833."
It was held that this was not operative without action by
the legislature. However, McLean, J., in concurring gave
his views on the question of interference with interstate
commerce as follows:
"In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden this court decided that
the power to regulate commerce is exclusively vested in Congress, and that no part of it can be exercised by a state."
"It has been contended that a state may exercise a commercial power if the same has not been exercised by Congress. And that this power of the state ceased when the
Federal authority was exerted over the same subject matter.
"This argument is founded upon a supposition that a
state may exercise a power which is expressly given to the
Federal Government, if it shall not exert the power in all
the modes and over all the subjects to which it can be applied. If this rule of construction were generally adopted
and practically enforced, it would be as fatal to the spirit
of the Constitution as it is opposed to its letter."
It will be noted that it is here considered that Gibbons v.
Ogden decided that the power of Congress is exclusive.
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Chief-Justice Taney, on the contrary, in a concurring opinion treats this as an open question and broaches the general
concurrent sovereignty theory, though avoiding a decision
on it. His language is:
" But the question upon which the different opinions have
been entertained is this: Would a regulation of commerce,
by a state, be valid until Congress should otherwise direct:
provided such regulation was consistent with the regulations
of Congress, and did not in any manner conflict with them.
" No case has yet arisen which made it necessary, in the
judgment of the court, to decide this question. It was
treated as an open one in the case The City of New York v.
Miln,19 decided at January Term, 1837, as will appear by
the opinions then 'delivered; and since that time the point
has never, in any form, come before the court. Nor am I
aware that there is any reason for supposing that such a
case is likely to arise. For the states have very little temptation to make a regulation of commerce when they know
that it may be immediately annulled by an act of Congress,
even if it does not at the time it is made by the state conflict
with any law of the General Government"
This is follbwed by an opinion by Baldwin, J., who states
in as strong language as can well be employed that it has
been conclusively settled that the power of Congress is exclusive. His language on this point is:
"That the power of Congress 'to regulate commerce
among the several states' is exclusive of any interference by
the states, has been, in my opinion, conclusively settled by
2
the solemn opinions of this court in Gibbons v. Ogden 1
2
1
and in Brown v. Maryland.
If these decisions are not to
be taken as the established construction of this clause of the
Constitution, I know of none which are not yet open to
doubt; nor can there be any adjudications of this court,
which must be considered as authoritative upon any question, if these are not to be so on this."
"Causes may, indeed, arise wherein there may be found
ii Peters, xo2.

=9 Wheat. 186-222.
21 2 Wheat. 438-446.
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difficulty in discriminating between regulations of 'commerce among the several states' and the regulations of 'the
internal police of a state;' but the subject matter of such
regulations, of either description, will lead to the true line
which separates them when they are examined with a disposition to avoid a collision between the powers granted to
the Federal Government, by the people of the several states,
and those which they have reserved exclusively to themselves. 'Commerce among the states,' as defined by this
court, is 'trade,' 'traffic,' 'intercourse,' and dealing in
articles of commerce between states, by its citizens or others,
and carried on in more than one state. Police relates only to
the internal concerns of one state, and commerce within it is
purely a matter of internal regulation, when confined to
those articles which have become so distributed as to form
items in the common mass of property. It follows that any
regulation which affects the commercial intercourse between
any two or more states, referring solely thereto, is within
the powers granted exclusively to Congress; and that those
regulations which affect only the commerce carried on
within one state, or which refer only to subjects of internal
police, are within the powers reserved."
The conflict here displayed between the theories is continued in,
The License Cases, 5 Howard, 504 (1847).
Taney, C. J., says:
" Each of the cases has arisen upon state laws, passed for
the purpose of discouraging the use of ardent spirits within
their respective territories by prohibiting their sale in small
quantities and without licenses previously obtained from the
state authorities. And the validity of each of them has been
drawn in question upon the ground that it is repugnant to
that part of the Constitution of the United States which
confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states."
"The question, therefore, brought up for decision is, . .
(or) in other words, whether the grant of the power to
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Congress is of itself a prohibition to the states, and renders
all state laws upon the subject null and void. .

.

. It is well

known that upon this subject a difference of opinion has
existed, and still exists, among the members of this court.
But with every respect for the opinion of my brethren with
whom I do not.agree, it appears to me to be very clear that
the mere grant of power to the General Government cannot,
upon any just principles of construction, be construed to be
an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any power over the
same subject by the states. The controlling and supreme
power over commerce with foreign nations and the several
states is undoubtedly conferred upon Congress. Yet, in my
judgment, the state may nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of. trade, or for the protection of the health of its
citizens, make regulations of commerce for its own ports
and harbors, and fowits own territory, and such regulations
are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress."
"It has been said, indeed, that quarantine and health laws
are passed by the states, not by virtue of a power to regulate
commerce, but by virtue of their police powers and in order
to guard the lives and health of their citizens. This, however, cannot be said of the pilot laws, which are yet admitted
to be equally valid. But what are the police powers of a
state? They are nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of
its dominions. And whether a state passes a quarantine
law, or a law to punish offences or to establish courts of
justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or
to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case
it exercises the same poiver-that is to say, the power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men within the limits of
its own dominions. It is by virtue of this power that it
legislates; and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the Constitution
of the United States. And when the validity of a state
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law making regulations of commerce is drawn into question
in a judicial tribunal, the authority to pass it cannot be
made to depend upon the motives that may be supposed to
have influenced the legislature, nor can the court inquire
whether it was intended to guard the citizens of the state
from pestilence and disease, or to make regulations of
commerce for the interests and convenience of trade.
"Upon this question the object and motive of the state
are of no importance and cannot influence the decision. It
is a question of power.
"Are the states absolutely prohibited by the Constitution
from making any regulations of foreign commerce? If
they are, then such regulations are null and void, whatever
may have been the motive of the state, or whatever the real
object of the law, and it requires no law of Congress to
control or annul them. Yet the case of Gibbons v. Ogden
unquestionably affirms that such regulations may be made
by a state, subject to the controlling power of Congress.
And if this may be done, it necessarily follows that the
grant of power to the Federal Government is not an absolute and entire prohibition to the states, but merely confers
upon Congress the superior and controlling power."
It is to be noted that the concurrent sovereignty theory
is here fully expounded and carried to its ultimate and logical limits, and it is held that the state has sovereign power
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in the absence
of regulation by Congress; that this is a part of the sovereignty of the state which was never yielded to Congress,
but merely made subject to the concurrent sovereignty of
Congress over this subject whenever Congress chooses to
exercise its sovereignty. Also, that the object and purpose
cannot be inquired into as to whether it is for any other
purpose or "to make regulations of commerce for the
interest and convenience of trade." In other words, a sovereign power exists to make regulations of commerce, both
interstate and foreign, subject only to the power of Congress
when exercised. If this theory be sound, a state can make
within its own limits any regulation of interstate or foreign
commerce whatsoever, merely because it wills to do so,
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provided Congress has not legislated on the same subject.
The sovereignty of each state over that part of interstate
and foreign commerce which takes place within its territory is absolutely equal and co-extensive with the sovereignty of Congress thereover, provided only that when the
latter sovereignty is actually exercised any conflicting actual
exercise of the former must yield. This theory we have
termed for convenience the general concurrent powers
theory.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, 12
How. 299 (1851).
The court sustained the constitutionality of a statute of
Pennsylvania regulating pilots and the taking of pilots by
vessels. In doing so the court held that it was a regulation
of navigation, and as commerce includes navigation, necessarily also a regulation of commerce. Proceeding to the
question whether the Constitution deprives the states of
power to regulate pilots, it holds that that question has
never been decided by this coUit, and then introduces a new
theory, wyhich we have called the local concurrent powers
theory; the language of the court in its opinion by Curtis,

J., being:
The grant of commercial power to Congress does not
contain any terms which expressly exclude the states fronm
exercising an authority over its subject-matter."
Either absolutely to affirm or deny that the nature of
this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress is to
lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and
to assert concerning all of them what is really applicable
but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or
plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature
as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
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"How then can we say, that by the mere grant of power
to regulate commerce, the states are deprived of all the
power to legislate on this subject, because from the nature
of the power the legislation of Congress must be exclusive.
"This would be to affirm that the nature of the power
is in any case something different from the nature of the
subject to which, in such case, the power extends, and that
the nature of the power necessarily demands, in all cases,
exclusive legislation by Congress, while the nature of one
of the subjects of that power, not only does not require such
exclusive legislation, but may be best provided for by many
different systems enacted by the states, in conformity with
the circumstances of the ports within their limits.
"In construing an instrument designed for the formation
of a government, and in determining the extent of one of its
important grants of power to legislate, we can make no such
distinction between the nature of the power and the nature
of the subject on which that power was intended practically
to operate, nor consider the grant more extensive by affirming of the power, what is not true of its subject now in
question."
"It is the opinion of a majority of the court that the mere
grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did
not deprive the states of power to regulate pilots, and
that although Congress has legislated on this subject, its
legislation manifests an intention, with a single exception,
not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to
the several states. To these precise questions, which are
all we are called on to decide, this opinion must be understood to be confined. It does not extend to the question
what other subjects, under the commercial power, are within
the exclusive power of Congress, or may be regulated by
the states in the absence of all Congressional legislation;
nor to the general question how far any regulation of a subject by Congress may be deemed to operate as an exclusion of all legislation by the states upon the same subject.
We decide the precise questions before us upon what we
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deem sound principles, applicable to this particular subject
in the state in which the legislation of Congress has left it.
We go no further."
Here it will be noted is introduced a new idea, that the
power over commerce is to be divided according to the
nature of the subjects on which it acts, that is according as
they are national or local in their nature, A distinction between the subjects of commerce is substituted for a distinction between the kinds of commerce; whether interstate or
intrastate, and between the powers over these two kinds of
commerce. And it is held that exclusive power is vested in
Congress over " whatever subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system,
or plan of regulation," but to the states is left concurrent
power over matters of a local nature. The theory is a new
one, the opinion is hesitating, and confines itself, so far as

the jurisdiction of the states is concerned, strictly to the
determination of the right of a state to regulate pilots, and
nothing else.
Mr. Justice McLean in dissenting takes exception to this
theory and says:
"That a state may regulate foreign commerce, or commerce among the states, is a doctrine which has been advanced by the individual judges of this court; but never
before, I believe, has such a power been sanctioned by the
decision of this court."
He considers the statute a regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore void.
Mr. Justice Danill agreed in the decision, but differed in
his reasoning. He held that the power to enact pilot laws,
though " in some degree connected with commercial intercourse, does not come essentially and regularly within that
power of commercial regulation vested by the Constitution
in Congress."
In conclusion he says: "I am forced to conclude that this
is an original and inherent power in the states and not one
to be merely tolerated, or held subject to the sanction of the
Federal Government."
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
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McLean adopts the true interpretation of Gibbons v. Ogden,
though it errs in holding that the regulation of pilots is
not within the reserved powers of the states; and that the
opinion of Mr. Justice Danill sets out the principles on which
this case should have been determined, in that it shows that
the regulation of pilots is not a direct regulation of coinmerce, but the exercise of a reserved power of the states,
and therefore not an invasion of the power of Congress,
which is exclusive.
We thus see that the court distinctly casts aside the general concurrent powers theory, but adopts and advances a
modified form of it. It in part also adopts the generally
accepted interpretation of Gibbons v. Ogden so far as to
hold that the power of Congress is exclusive as to some
things. It is a compromise between the two theories.
The first was that of Chief-Justice Marshall and Mr.
Justice Story, which we call the exclusive-reserved powers
theory, to the effect that Congress has exclusive power to
directly regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The
second was that of Chief-Justice Taney, which we call the
general concurrent powers theory, to the effect that Congress
and the s:ates have general concurrent powers as wide as
sovereignty. The new theory of Mr. Justice Curtis, which
we call the local concurrent powers theory, is that Congress
has an exclusive power as to national subjects of commerce,
and Congress and the states a concurrent power as to local.
This attempted combination of two essentially inconsis.ent theories, it will be seen in the later cases, has since led to
much confusion of reasoning.
James S. Rogers.
(To be continued.)

